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Abstract Since James Carroll (1971) made a strong case for ‘‘participatory
technology’’, scientists, engineers, policy-makers and the public at large have seen
quite a number of different approaches to design and implement participatory
processes in technology assessment and technology policy. As these participatory
experiments and practices spread over the last two decades, one could easily get the
impression that participation turned from a theoretical normative claim to a working
practice that goes without saying. Looking beyond the well-known forerunners and
considering the ambivalent experiences that have been made under different con-
ditions in various places, however, the ‘‘if’’ and ‘‘how’’ of participation are still
contested issues when questions of technology are on the agenda. Legitimation
problems indicate that attempts to justify participation in a given case have not been
entirely successful in the eyes of relevant groups among the sponsors, participants,
organizers or observers. Legitimation problems of participatory processes in tech-
nology assessment and technology policy vary considerably, and they do so not only
with the two domains and the ways of their interrelation or the specific features of
the participatory processes. If we ask whether or not participation is seen as
problematic in technology assessment and technology policy-making and in what
sense it is being evaluated as problematic, then we find that the answer depends also
on the approaches and criteria that have been used to legitimize or delegitimize the
call for a specific design of participation.
Zusammenfassung Seit James Carroll (1971) fu¨r das Konzept einer ‘‘participa-
tory technology’’ pla¨dierte, konnten Wissenschaftler, Ingenieure, Politiker und
die O¨ffentlichkeit eine Vielzahl von unterschiedlichen Ansa¨tzen im Bereich
des Designs und der Umsetzung von partizipativen Prozessen in der
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Technologiefolgenabscha¨tzung (TA) und in der Technologiepolitik beobachten.
Angesichts der Ausbreitung dieser partizipatorischen Experimente und Praktiken in
den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten konnte man leicht den Eindruck gewinnen, dass
Partizipation nun keine bloß theoretisch begru¨ndete normative Forderung mehr
darstellt, sondern zu einem selbstversta¨ndlichen Bestandteil der Praxis geworden ist.
Jenseits der bekannten Vorreiter zeigen die ambivalenten Erfahrungen, die an
verschiedenen Orten unter unterschiedlichen Bedingungen mit den Ansa¨tzen einer
partizipativen TA gemacht worden sind, jedoch, dass sowohl das ‘‘Ob’’ als auch das
‘‘Wie’’ von Partizipation weiterhin umstritten sind, wenn Technologien auf der
Agenda stehen. Legitimationsprobleme verweisen darauf, dass Versuche zur
Rechtfertigung von Partizipation in einem bestimmten Fall nicht oder doch nicht
ga¨nzlich erfolgreich waren, jedenfalls nicht in den Augen wichtiger Gruppen unter
den Tra¨gern, Beteiligten, Organisatoren oder Beobachtern eines solchen Prozesses.
Fragt man nach Legitimationsproblemen von partizipatorischen Prozessen in der
TA und der Technologiepolitik, so zeigen sich bedeutende Unterschiede und diese
Unterschiede ha¨ngen nicht nur mit den beiden unterschiedlichen Bereichen der TA
und der Technologiepolitik und der jeweiligen Art und Weise ihres Wech-
selverha¨ltnisses zusammen, sondern auch mit den spezifischen Merkmalen der
jeweils in Rede stehenden partizipatorischen Prozesse. Wenn danach gefragt wird,
ob und in welchem Sinn Partizipation in der TA oder Technologiepolitik in einem
bestimmten Fall als problematisch bewertet wird oder nicht, dann ha¨ngt die Antwort
schließlich auch davon ab, welcher Ansatz und welche Kriterien herangezogen
wurden, um die Forderung nach Partizipation und ihre spezifische Ausgestaltung zu
legitimieren oder zu delegitimieren.
Re´sume´ Depuis que James Carroll plaida (en 1971) pour l’ide´e d’une ‘‘partici-
patory technology’’, scientifiques, inge´nieurs, politiciens et le public assiste`rent a`
une multitude d’approches diffe´rentes de conception et de mise en œuvre de pro-
cessus participatifs dans l’e´valuation des conse´quences technologiques et la poli-
tique technologique. En voyant les expe´riences et pratiques participatives des deux
de´cennies e´coule´es, on pouvait facilement avoir l’impression que la participation
n’e´tait plus une exigence normative the´orique mais qu’elle e´tait devenue un au-
tomatisme. Toutefois, au-dela` des pionniers connus, les expe´riences ambivalentes
acquises dans les approches d’une e´valuation participative des conse´quences tech-
nologiques a` diffe´rents endroits dans des conditions individuelles montrent que la
controverse persiste sur le ‘‘si’’ et le ‘‘comment’’ de la participation lorsque des
technologies sont en jeu. Des proble`mes de le´gitimation indiquent que des tentatives
de justifier la participation dans un certain cas n’ont pas ou seulement en partie
mene´ a` bien, au moins a` l’avis de groupes influents parmi les sponsors, participants,
organisateurs ou observateurs d’un tel processus. Les proble`mes de le´gitimation de
processus participatifs dans l’e´valuation des conse´quences technologiques et de la
politique technologique diffe`rent de manie`re conside´rable, ces diffe´rences n’e´ma-
nant pas seulement des deux domaines diffe´rents de l’e´valuation et de la politique et
de leur corre´lation, mais aussi du caracte`re spe´cifique de chacun des processus
participatifs en question. Lorsque l’on se demande si la participation dans l’e´val-
uation des conse´quences technologiques ou la politique technologique est
8 Poiesis Prax (2012) 9:7–26
123
conside´re´e comme proble´matique ou pas dans un certain cas, la re´ponse de´pendra en
fin de compte aussi de l’approche et des crite`res ayant e´te´ pris en compte pour
le´gitimer ou de´le´gitimer l’exigence de participation et sa conception spe´cifique.
1 Introduction
Since political scientist James Carroll (1971) made a strong case for ‘‘participatory
technology’’ in the leading scientific journal ‘‘Science’’ 40 years ago, scientists,
engineers, policy-makers and the public at large have seen quite a number of
different approaches to design and implement participatory processes in technology
assessment and technology policy. As these participatory experiments and practices
spread over the last two decades and some forms became almost standard operating
procedures in some Western democracies, one could easily get the impression that
participation turned from a theoretical normative claim to a working practice that
goes without saying. Looking beyond the well-known forerunners and considering
the ambivalent experiences that have been made with different designs under
different conditions in various places, we recognize that evaluations of ‘‘partici-
patory technology’’ still differ. It is still a contested issue whether or not
participation is the way to go when questions of technology are on the agenda and if
so, how participatory processes should be designed and implemented.
The task of this paper is to reconsider this debate about participation with a
special focus on the question of legitimacy from the perspective of a political
scientist. To that end, I shall start with a short recollection of the idea of
‘‘participatory technology’’ and first evaluations of the experiences made with the
implementation of participatory approaches related to technology focussing on
problems of legitimacy (2). While the original idea of ‘‘participatory technology’’ as
well as the title of the international conference at the Institute of Technology
Assessment (ITA) in Vienna related the issue of participation to ‘‘questions of
technology’’ in general, a focus on legitimacy suggests the need to distinguish more
clearly between technology assessment and technology policy. Both these fields are
different object domains with different functions (3). Having introduced these
distinctions with regard to the subject area, the next basic step is to say something
about the concepts of legitimacy and legitimation from a political science
perspective in order to clarify in what sense we can understand the notion of
‘‘legitimate hope’’ as one pole of the alternative presented at the conference in
Vienna (4). Reconsidering the role of participation in technology assessment and
policy then requires rethinking the reasons that have been given to justify it in the
first place: Why should there be participation when it comes to ‘‘questions of
technology’’? (5) Looking at the opposite pole of the juxtaposition, the suggestion
that participation in technology assessment might be nothing more than an
‘‘illusion’’ calls for some kind of comparison with the available ‘‘evidence’’: What
do we know about experiences with that ‘‘illusion’’ from empirical studies and
evaluations of processes and practices that claim to be participatory? (6) On the
grounds of some reflections about the theoretical concepts involved, about the ways
the claim for participation has been justified with regard to technology assessment
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and policy and how that claim has been implemented in empirically observable
participatory processes, I can then turn to the question of legitimation problems of
these participatory processes (7) and look at specific problems these processes imply
for the role of TA-experts who act as policy analysts in these participatory settings
(8). The paper ends with a summary and conclusion about what appears to be the
politics of legitimation and delegitimation with regard to participatory approaches
in technology assessment and policy (9).
2 Participatory technology: from emerging trends to early experiences
in the 1970s
Political science has a rather long history of analysing, recommending and
evaluating participation related to ‘‘questions of technology’’. The wave of
democratization at the end of the 1960s provided the background for an increasing
interest in these issues beyond the boundaries of the academic discipline. A
prominent early piece is an article entitled ‘‘participatory technology’’ that political
scientist James Carroll (1971) published in the leading scientific journal ‘‘Science’’
in the early 1970s. Addressing an audience that consists mainly of natural scientists,
Carroll (1971: 647) did not begin with normative considerations but started to
‘‘analyze several facts of which people are becoming increasingly aware that
suggest why participatory technology is emerging as a trend’’. Like other scholars at
the time, he interpreted the call for more participation as a reaction to social impacts
of technology which would lead to alienation. And he explained the next step that
was leading from the sociological diagnosis of social alienation to the political
claim for (more) participation which was accompanied by various questions of
legitimation.
There is considerable speculative and observational evidence… that the scope
and complexities of science and technology are contributing to the develop-
ment of social alienation in contemporary society. …I analyze the incipient
emergence of participatory technology as a countervailing force to techno-
logical alienation in contemporary society. I interpret participatory technology
as one limited aspect of a more general search for ways of making technology
more responsive to the felt needs of the individual and of society. The term
participatory technology refers to the inclusion of people in the social and
technical processes of developing, implementing, and regulating a technology,
directly and through agents under their control, when the people included
assert that their interests will be substantially affected by the technology and
when they advance a claim to a legitimate and substantial participatory role in
its development and implementation. (Carroll 1971: 647)
Carroll’s short formula ‘‘participatory technology’’ suggests a broader focus on
technology and a concern of drawing the attention to the political dimensions
inherent in technological development as such. His explanation entails a line of
reasoning that was further developed by philosophers of technology (e.g. Winner
1980) to justify the normative claim to a ‘‘legitimate and substantial participatory
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role’’ when ‘‘questions of technology’’ are on the agenda. That line of reasoning
draws an analogy of constructing and implementing technologies to processes of
law making. In this view, technology is no longer seen as ‘‘neutral’’ or as an
instrument that could be used for all kinds of purposes, but as value-loaded and with
the power to enforce these values and norms.
One primary reason for the emergence of participatory technology is the
realization that technology often embodies and expresses political value choices
that, in their operations and effects, are binding on individuals and groups,
whether such choices have been made in political forums or elsewhere.…To an
indeterminate extent, technological processes in contemporary society have
become the equivalent of a form of law – that is, an authoritative or binding
expression of social norms and values from which the individual or a group may
have no immediate recourse. (Carroll 1971: 648)
As a political scientist, Carroll (1971: 649) did not only point to new rights and
opportunities participation might bring with regard to a more open deliberation. He
also stressed the limits of such an approach when it comes to binding decisions and
their implementation. New participatory processes might include, enable and
empower more participants. But in the context of a modern constitutional
democracy, these processes would not put the participants outside of the law.
Participatory technology is one limited way of raising questions about the
specific technological forms in terms of which social change is brought about.
It is directed toward the development of processes and forums that are
consistent with the expectations and values of the participatory individuals,
who may resort to them in the absence of other means of making their views
known. In participatory technology, however, as in other participatory
processes, the opportunity to be heard is not synonomous (sic!) with the
right to be obeyed. (Carroll 1971: 649)
What appeared as an emerging trend in the beginning of the 1970s turned into an
experimental, but at the same time controversial praxis that could already be
analysed and evaluated by social scientists at the end of the decade. In the
beginning, problems of legitimacy were associated with technologies and the
established non-participatory forms of technological policy-making. Now
the reforms invented to solve the problems which lead to the call for more
participation appeared to have legitimation problems of their own. In a prominent
article, Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollak (1979: 55) highlighted the strategic
interaction of organized groups of citizens demanding participation and govern-
ments offering participatory settings to overcome the legitimation problems of
existing technology policies which were including only experts and administrations.
In this perspective, participation appears not only as a demand from below, but also
as a strategic move from above. After almost 10 years of experience, what
researchers observed looked like an arena where citizens and non-governmental
groups were interacting with governmental agencies in something that could be
described as the politics of legitimation and delegitimation in various fields related
to ‘‘questions of technology’’.
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‘Demystification’, ‘accountability’, ‘citizen participation’. These are slogans
of recent disputes in the U.S. and Western Europe through which citizens’
groups have sought a voice in technological decisionmaking.…Moreover, the
disputes have challenged the legitimacy of the technical experts and
authorities heretofore responsible – almost exclusively – for decisions that
are technologically based but which have dramatic social impacts. Awareness
of the decline in public trust has stimulated a great variety of government
efforts to involve citizens more directly in creating and implementing policies
on technology. (Nelkin and Pollak 1979: 55)
Nelkin and Pollak (1979) examined these efforts under a heading that does not differ
too much from the title of the conference in Vienna 30 years later. Their evaluation
of ‘‘Public participation in technological decisions’’ was structured by the
alternative: ‘‘Reality or grand illusion?’’ In their cross-country review, Nelkin and
Pollak (1979: 55) found that the procedures invented by governments as reforms
showed considerable variations with regard to their understanding of public
participation and the role of technical and political information in the decision-
making processes.
But most such participatory ‘reforms’ have been based on the assumption that
they will lead to the acceptance of controversial technologies and to the
restoration of the legitimacy of decision-making institutions. The procedures
considered appropriate depend on national political styles and on the
perceived nature of the problem of public acceptability. If lack of confidence
is thought to be a problem arising from insufficient technical evidence, then
the goal is to ascertain ‘scientific truth’. This leads to a structure based on
scientific advice to public representatives. If the controversy is defined in
terms of alienation, a more participatory or consultative system is developed.
And if the problem of public consensus is defined in terms of inadequate
information, it is assumed that people oppose technologies because they are
poorly informed. The task then becomes one of ‘education’. (Nelkin and
Pollak 1979: 55)
According to Nelkin and Pollak, these participatory reforms have their own
legitimation problems, as they presuppose a limited and one-sided definition of what
the original problem of legitimacy was and how it could be solved:
Most of these procedures rest on a traditional ‘welfare model’ – in which risks
are defined as problems to be dealt with, mainly by experts. It is assumed that
if a problem is solved by a respected group of elites or by using the best
available scientific opinion, this will enhance the legitimacy of public
authorities. And it is assumed that adequate information will contribute to
consensus. Yet conflict and mistrust persist, and the procedures themselves are
often debunked. Neither public participation nor enlightened representation
appear to assure the acceptability of controversial technology. (Nelkin and
Pollak 1979 60)
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To overcome the persistent mistrust and conflicts, Nelkin and Pollak suggest an
approach that does not rest on a one-sided definition of the legitimation problems
involved, but takes the questions of opposing citizens seriously to proceed with a
mutually recognized definition of problems and controversies.
What then must one do to enhance legitimacy? What kind of procedures
would be acceptable to critical groups? To explore the sources of persistent
cynicism about procedural reforms, we turn to five questions frequently asked
by opposition groups: How are the boundaries of the problem defined? Who
participates in the experiment? Who conducts the procedure? What is the
distribution of technical expertise? Is there really a choice? (Nelkin and Pollak
1979: 60)
Today, almost all problem-solving strategies are confronted with an idea that
originated and gained currency in contexts dominated by management sciences: the
idea that at the end of ‘‘evidence-based’’ comparative research, policy analysts
should come up with a proposal which can be suggested as ‘‘best practice’’ and then
transferred to other contexts. Interestingly enough, this idea already played a role in
structuring expectations 30 years ago. However, Nelkin and Pollak already did not
see any meaningful way of meeting this expectation when problems of legitimation
are at stake. Quite to the contrary:
Comparative policy studies often approach common problems, seeking a ‘best
solution’ that can be transferred to other contexts. Our analysis is not to be
interpreted in this way. The structure of experiments, and the assumptions
about who should participate, reflect basic political differences and cannot be
simply transferred without considerable adjustment. Indeed, transferring
means of conflict resolution can pose problems not unlike those of technology
transfer. (Nelkin and Pollak 1979: 64)
Yet, this rejection of the idea of ‘‘best solutions’’ does not imply that nothing
generalizable can be learned from the experiments in participatory experiments
related to technology policy.
What can be generalized is not the structure of the experiments, but the
conditions that will allow dissenting groups to express their concerns and to
communicate effectively with administrative agencies. These conditions
include: A ‘formula’ that gives due weight to social and political factors;
appropriate involvement of affected interests; an unbiased management; a fair
distribution of expertise; and a real margin of choice. Actually, such
procedural conditions are not likely to produce consensus, but they may
reduce public mistrust and hostility toward political and administrative
institutions in order to allow de´tente. Our conclusion, in fact, is that de´tente is
a more appropriate and realistic goal. (Nelkin and Pollak 1979: 64)
Reconsidering the findings and evaluations of Nelkin and Pollak (1979) at the end of
the 1970s in relation to some of the more recent critiques of participatory
approaches (see below), one might very well get the feeling of a de´ja` vu, as if some
problems and issues associated with participation have a tendency to be forgotten
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over the years and need to be (re-)discovered in every new wave of democratization
after a while. Certainly the early 1990s have seen another wave of democratization
after the downfall of the iron curtain. And recent developments in Germany suggest
that after the first decade of the twenty-first century, yet another citizen protest
culture is on the rise questioning established policy-making processes in the name of
more participation and transparency. Against this background, one might get the
impression that participation is now generally to be considered as established
practice that goes without saying and needs no justification. However, such an
impression is misleading if we analyse issues related to science and technology.
3 ‘‘Questions of technology’’, technology assessment and technology policy
What precisely is the object area we are talking about when we relate technology to
the idea of participation? In a certain rather basic empirical sense, one could argue
that the term ‘‘participatory technology’’ is something like a truism. Technologies
do not construct, invent or distribute themselves in modern societies by their own
force or nature (although some of its promoters and opponents sometimes create that
impression). There is always someone involved or taking part in these societal
processes of developing technologies (technologization) or applying specific
physical techniques or using technical artefacts (technization). Thus, one might
say that there is always some kind of participation of some actors in these processes
related to technology. Scientists, engineers and industrialists are usually the first
groups of actors that people in modern societies will name if asked to say who the
actors are playing the most important roles in processes of inventing und
distributing new technologies. If translated into such a framework that is not
entirely technocentric in the sense of being conceptually devoid of any human
actors, then the idea of ‘‘participatory technology’’ is more than a truism insofar as it
raises the question: Who is or should participate in what kind of activity related to
technology? And since there was an established set of actors who were always
already involved in these activities at the time, the idea of participatory technology
came to mean primarily going beyond the established actor constellation comprising
interested innovators of a technological community and related office-holders in
public administrations. And it meant raising the question: Who else is or should be
participating in the development, use and regulation of a particular technology? In
the context of these debates, processes would be called ‘‘participatory’’ if they
would include actors who are not office-holders in the established institutions or are
not already entitled to take part in the assessment procedures of the scientific and
political system (Saretzki 2003: 44–46).
While the TA 2011 conference as a whole defines its object area broadly as
‘‘questions of technology’’, the perspective taken here will not address issues of
participation that might arise in all societal fields which are or could be subject to
processes of technologization or technization. I shall rather focus on technology
assessment and technology policy as two different, but strongly interrelated
domains. The claim is, on the one hand, that issues of participation are and should
be considered differently in each of these domains with regard to problems of
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legitimation. Since these domains are structured by different institutional principles
and fulfil different functions, problems of legitimation arise and are discussed on
different grounds. While both have to do with ‘‘technology’’ as their subject matter,
the basic explicit function of TA is to provide some kind of ‘‘assessment’’, whereas
the activities associated with the domain of technology policy go beyond the level
of knowledge production and assessment and proceed to the level of making and
implementing binding decisions. On the other hand, as these domains are strongly
interrelated in many policy processes, I argue that specific problems of legitimation
in particular cases cannot be understood adequately without analysing and
evaluating also the specific ways of their interrelation in concrete contexts. From
an overall perspective, we can see that participatory designs have been coupled
(or decoupled) with one or both of these domains—a difference that makes a
difference with regard to its possible impacts.
Technology policy (TP) can be understood as a functionally and institutionally
differentiated policy field. It is part of the public order or more precisely: part of the
political system and includes all deliberations and decisions in the political system
explicitly and intentionally related to processes of technologization and techniza-
tion. As for their different functions, technology policies may be distributive by
offering financial support for some technologies, redistributive by transferring
resources from one field of technology to another, regulatory by defining the rules
and regulations or even constitutive by establishing the principles for a technolog-
ical regime. Since decisions of the political system are binding for its members, it is
generally understood in a democracy that these members as citizens have a right to
participate in the decision-making process that leads to decisions which they finally
all have to accept as binding. Of course, the ways citizens can actually exercise
these rights depend on the way their democratic institutions are designed and
functioning. And—to pick up one point in Carroll’s (1971: 647) definition of
‘‘participatory technology’’—it makes a difference, whether they can do it
‘‘directly’’ (i.e. in an institutional setting that corresponds with models of direct
or participatory democracy) or ‘‘through agents under their control’’ (which
corresponds with models of representative democracy). Yet in principle, within a
policy field which clearly is part of a democratic political system, the logic of this
system suggests that it should not be the ‘‘if’’ but the ‘‘how’’ that may give rise to
controversies over the legitimacy of participation in technology policy.
Technology assessment (TA) can be conceived of as a functionally and institution-
ally differentiated system of (technology-related) knowledge production and evalu-
ation. Its most cited specific function is to produce and evaluate knowledge about the
preconditions of inventing, options of shaping and consequences of applying (new)
technologies in society and the environment and to formulate alternative options for
policies related to these technologies. Historically, some prominent institutions of
technology assessment (like the OTA) have been initiated and sponsored by parts of the
political system, assigned primarily with a narrow function of advising and counselling
those political decision-makers who work within the established institutions like
parliament or administration on specific issues on the public agenda of technology
policy. Public controversies about complex and contested technologies play an
important role in these institutionalization processes. While some TA institutions
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became part of the legislative or administrative branch of government, others grew out
of civil society activities or developed out of problem-oriented research within the
established scientific system.
Today, in many industrialized democracies, TA institutions form some kind of
network which can be conceptualized in a simplified model as a system mediating
between the political-administrative system, the scientific system and the public
(Fig. 1).
According to this concept, neither TA is part of the scientific system nor does it
entirely belong to the political system. If it is also oriented towards the public
sphere, TA has a mission of its own which makes it an advocate of enlightened
understanding on the side of all three addressees: What do office-holders, scientists
and citizens have to know to make reflective judgements and enlightened decisions
on issues of technology? Conceptualizing TA in such a way as mediating between
two institutionally and functionally differentiated systems and the public without
being part of one of them has a number of implications. It implies that TA has to
fulfil complex communicative functions that are not appropriately captured if we
understand TA as a set of instruments from a tool box or as a social technology
(to assess physical technologies). Instrumentalist, tool box or technological models
of TA fail to address its specific communicative and mediating tasks. With regard to
their communicative functions, it is more appropriate to conceptualize TA as an
analytic-deliberative process mediating between the functionally and institutionally
differentiated systems of science and politics and the public (Stern and Fineberg
1996; Saretzki 2005: 354–355).
To make a distinction between technology assessment and technology policy
provides the conceptual framework for a differentiated consideration of the theory
and practice of participation in these fields. Participatory processes can be observed
(or called for) in technology assessment (pTA) or in technology policy (pTP) or in
both domains. The standard operating procedure in both domains is still ‘‘non-
participatory’’ (in the sense of not going beyond the conventional arrangements of
established scientific experts and political elites to include other actors, especially





Fig. 1 Technology assessment
mediating between science,
politics and the public
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observe participation in TA, for example, citizens or stakeholders being involved in
producing some kind of assessment and recommendations for technology policy
(see Table 1). The output of these pTA processes (e.g. citizen reports) can then be
taken up as an input to deliberations, decision-making and implementation within
the established political arenas and institutions. Thus, participation of citizens or
stakeholders in TA does not necessarily include their participation in the field of
technology policy.
Nonetheless, some proponents as well as some opponents of pTA are assuming
that pTA also implies a participatory mode of technology policy-making in the
sense of inventing a policy field fully in accordance with the model of a
participatory democracy. This assumption is neglecting the difference between the
domains of technology assessment and technology policy. To modify the remark
James Carroll (1971: 649) made very early in the debate: the right to take part in the
formulation of problem definitions and policy proposals is not the same as the right
to take part in decision-making binding for the citizenry.
4 ‘‘Legitimate hope’’ or ‘‘mere illusion’’? Concepts of legitimacy
and legitimation in political science
At first glance, the notion of ‘‘legitimate hope’’ which was presented as one pole at
the conference in Vienna is somewhat puzzling from a political science perspective.
It puts together two terms—‘‘legitimation’’ and ‘‘hope’’—which many political
scientists would rather understand as belonging to two different spheres. Why? To
find an answer, let us look at the meaning of the terms. To start with the second:
What is hope? According to standard dictionaries of current English, a first meaning
of hope is that of a ‘‘feeling of expectation and desire; feeling of trust or
confidence’’ (Hornby et al. 1972: 476). If hope is a feeling, can hopes (i.e. feelings)
be qualified as legitimate or illegitimate? Although there is some rethinking of the
role of emotions in political science in general and policy inquiry in particular
(Fischer 2009: 272–294), the concept of legitimation as understood in political
science is still primarily related to processes of justification by giving reasons. If
hope is understood as a feeling or emotion, hope can certainly be a strong motif, and
its frustration can be deeply demotivating, especially for those who shared that
feeling in the beginning. But what is its relation to reason giving, which requires
relating it to a system of reference that provides the grounds for its legitimacy?
Other explications from more sophisticated dictionaries describe the meaning of
hope as an ‘‘expectation’’ or ‘‘prospect’’ of something to come (Willmann 2001:
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551). As far as its relation to the concept of legitimation is concerned, this
interpretation is less puzzling as it seems to be compatible with an understanding of
legitimation as justification by giving reasons. Nonetheless, we have to ask: In what
sense can we call an expectation to be legitimate? At least the argumentative
structure of the answer seems to be clear: if hope is interpreted as something we
expect, then its legitimacy would stem from what is desired or positively expected
in the future, from a state of affairs that is supposed to be good and valuable.
This leads to the second question concerning the meaning of the terms: What is
legitimate? Or more precisely: How do we understand the term in our context? If we
start with the help of etymology, then the meaning of the term legitimacy can be
traced back to the Latin ‘‘legitimus’’ which is translated as ‘‘rightful’’ or ‘‘lawful’’.
Its original meaning played a role in the practices used to define the status of a child,
especially a son, who was regarded as ‘‘legitimus’’ if he stemmed from a lawful
relation of a father and mother, or more precisely: if he was born in the realm of a
rightful institution, in this case: marriage. His status as a ‘‘legitimate’’ child was thus
derived from a social institution constituting the order of society. Thus, in more
general terms, for someone to be recognized as legitimate, his or her status had to be
derived from an institution that is generally acknowledged as rightful. Of course, in
case of doubt, specific acts of justification can be more or less convincing in
concrete cases. Yet, the logic of justifying someone’s status as ‘‘legitimate’’ in a
social or political order would imply a reference to the normative principles on
which this order had been build, rather than to the prospects, effects or
consequences one could expect under the circumstances given. Needless to say,
the tales of kings and queens are not the only well-known experiences that disputes
about whether or not someone’s status is legitimate were not always conducted with
the aim of finding out whether it was rightful that he or she acquired the status in
question. With the benefit of hindsight, there are numerous examples that sometimes
disputes about this question were tacitly influenced by expectations and prospects
about the possible effects of the answer.
As a result, experiences like these suggest that one should follow a critical
approach to the study of what is ‘‘legitimate’’, which reflects both normative and
empirical aspects (Saretzki 2009). In terms of concept building, many political
scientists would want make this explicit by introducing a distinction between
legitimacy and legitimation. Following this distinction, the concept of legitimacy
refers to the normative claim that a political order (or something that is derived from
this order) ought to be respected as legitimate as a whole because it can normatively
be justified as rightful. The concept of legitimation is interpreted as referring to
factual belief-systems of political actors, elites and citizens, who currently or over
longer periods of time think that a specific political order actually is legitimate and
deserves to be accepted. The term legitimation is also used in studies of practices of
justification by giving reasons, that is, attempts of political actors to actually justify
the order (he or she represents) as rightful at a particular place and time. These
practices can be observed particularly in situations when actors representing a
political order are challenged by attempts to delegitimize the order as such or
criticize the way the office-holders interpret their rights and duties and use of power
or resources within a given order (Nullmeier et al. 2010).
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In political science, the concepts of legitimacy and legitimation were originally
and primarily related to the order of a political system or even of society as a whole.
Yet within such general frames, it is possible to raise questions concerning the
legitimacy and legitimation of the order of policy subsystems (e.g. a policy field
such as technology policy), systems of advising and counselling policy-makers,
systems of assessing technologies or systems of technologies.
5 Why participation? Approaches to justify participation in TA and TP
As far as its legitimation is concerned, one can distinguish two basically different
approaches to justify participation in technology assessment and technology policy.
One is normative in a straightforward sense insofar as it refers to basic principles of
normative theories of democracy: If and to the extent that processes of technization
and technologization are major forces in a democratic society, then its citizens or
their representatives should have a chance to participate in the assessment and the
policy-making processes related to the technologies in question as a consequence of
the democratic principle of self-government of free and equal citizens. As the
technology assessment process is seen as providing the grounds for judgements of
possible problems and options to solve them, TA is conceived of as part of the
democratic opinion- and will-formation that precedes and predetermines the
decision-making in the field of technology policy and thus is also subject to claims
for democratic participation.
While this explicitly normative principle of justification can be and mostly is
interpreted to include both technology assessment and technology policy as part of
the deliberation, it allows for a great deal of latitude with regard to the model of
democracy and the model of citizenship that serve as the normative system of
reference. These models can vary considerably. A first and very often cited
distinction had already been pointed out by James Carroll (1971: 647): In his
definition, ‘‘participatory technology’’ refers to the inclusion of people in two
different ways, namely either ‘‘directly’’ or ‘‘through agents under their control’’.
Thus, the idea can be interpreted with reference to a model of direct democracy or
some form of participatory democracy on the one hand or established institutions of
representative or parliamentarian democracy on the other hand. Further differences
between other models of democracy (e.g. models of liberal, republican or
deliberative democracy) may come into play (Saretzki 2002: 96–100, Biegelbauer
and Hansen 2011). What is required in this explicitly normative approach of
justification is a line of reasoning that explicates a reference to the basic democratic
principle of self-government of free and equal citizens.
The other approach to justify participation in technology assessment and
technology policy is functional: In this view, participation is justified as being
instrumental in achieving certain goals and fulfilling certain functions that provide
the basis of its legitimation. New technologies should be introduced (and old
technologies should be evaluated) with broad public participation, so these
arguments run, because participation fulfils certain functions more effectively
and efficiently than other (non-participatory) ways of assessing technologies and
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policy-making in technology-related fields. Functional justifications can focus on
informational, social, spatial or time-related dimensions of technization processes,
of technology assessment or of technology policy.
In this functional line of reasoning, the informational dimension is most
prominent and often seen as providing the grounds for other functional consider-
ations. As far as TA is concerned, it provides the rationale for the whole enterprise.
Seen the other way round, participation was justified as part of an ideal concept and
methodology of TA. In the German discussion, participation is one of five basic
elements of the concept of a ‘‘comprehensive TA’’ (Paschen and Petermann 1991:
26–30). Apart from such conceptual and methodological justifications, participation
is sometimes presented as an instrument of information distribution or information
collection, that is, it can help gaining access to the ‘‘local’’ knowledge of potential
users or affected groups. As far as the social dimension is concerned, participation
can be seen as an instrument of overcoming sceptic and hostile attitudes among
certain groups in specific places or the citizenry at large, helping to create public
understanding and acceptance. As for the time dimension, there are many calls for
early participation of potentially interested, affected or engaged groups, often
suggesting that such early inclusion, although costly in time (and money) upon first
sight, might actually save time at the end of the day, if it helps avoiding conflicts
usually leading to delays of the original schedule. Within a functional approach,
various combinations of different dimensions are possible.
The conceptual reflections reveal that the juxtaposition of participation in
‘‘questions of technology’’ as being either ‘‘legitimate hope’’ or ‘‘mere illusion’’
presupposes a functional mode of justification. What about the other pole of the
juxtaposition: ‘‘mere illusion’’?
6 Empirical analysis and evaluation of participatory processes in TA
In the light of the various participatory experiments in TA that have been analysed
and evaluated by social scientists, it seems obvious that these scholars did not have
illusions and did not write fiction. There is no denying the fact that there are
practical experiences with participation in TA. What scholars have in mind when
they create an alternative with one pole of the juxtaposition framed as ‘‘mere’’ or
‘‘grand illusion’’ can be translated into a concern with the scope and the meaning of
‘‘participation’’. Recollecting that the diagnosis of James Carroll (1971) is already
40 years old, one might raise the question whether or not there is still a trend
towards ‘‘participatory technology’’.
What Nelkin and Pollak (1979: 55) found in their comparative study at the end of
the 1970s can be extended to the following periods: participatory designs invented
by governments as reforms ‘‘showed considerable variations with regard to their
understanding of public participation and the role of technical and political
information in the decision-making processes’’ (emphasis added, cf. for later studies
in pTA, for example Joss and Bellucci 2002; Abels and Bora 2004; Hennen et al.
2004; Reber 2007; Felt and Fochler 2008).
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Participatory projects in TA differed in terms of their topics, goals, their models
of representation, modes of participation and communication, their structure and
organization as well as their locations and time frames and, finally, the strategies
of the actors involved. With regard to the often controversial dimension of
representation, empirical studies showed designs focussing on expert groups
(including only scientists or broader categories of professionals), stakeholder groups
(including established interest groups, engaged activists or citizen groups), office-
holders and political representatives from non-partisan institutions or partisan
organizations (political parties or associations). Sometimes representation was
constructed by open recruitment based on random samples or everyman partici-
pation. The modes of participation varied in terms of the range of rights and duties
(information, hearing, initiative, vote), the concept of equality (equal access vs.
equal opportunity), and the structure showed variations ranging from constant and
continuous forms (centralized, e.g. conclave) to more differentiated patterns of
participation (decentralized, e.g. by topic, social or spatial criteria). Empirical
analysis also revealed remarkable variations with regard to different contexts of the
projects like the context of initiation, the institutional context, the context of
utilization and the broader societal and cultural context.
Although the general picture is one of heterogeneity, empirical studies and
evaluations also pointed to some trends. The emergence of the projects could often
be explained as a reaction to specific (‘‘wicked’’) problems and as a reaction to
specific institutional legitimation problems. The timing suggested a certain
correspondence with the overarching waves of democratization (or their decline).
Some models like the consensus conference appeared to follow models of policy
transfer and diffusion, indicating a sort of normalization and standardization in the
field of participatory TA. According to some critics there are projects showing signs
of being instrumentalized, while other critical observers saw more general trends in
the direction of further professionalization, commercialization or industrialization.
Evaluations differed in terms of the underlying social perspectives of the roles
involved (initiator, sponsor, coordinator, facilitator, organizer, participant, addres-
see, observer) and their points of reference, that is, whether the evaluation focussed
on the process or the result (or both), more specifically, whether the preferred object
of evaluation was the concept, structure, course, output, impact or even outcome. As
far as the results are concerned, evaluations differed in terms of their levels of
reference: Some remained within the typical range of TA, evaluating the
information value of particular arguments, the comprehensiveness of all relevant
arguments or the level of argumentative reflexivity and cooperation in the
conceptualization of complex controversies (rational dissent). Already at the border
of the domain of technology policy are evaluations that focus on questions like: Did
the participants achieve a substantial consensus on policy proposals? And some
evaluators would only give good credits if the project actually ended in the effective
implementation of a consensus on policy proposals (implemented consensus).
Finally, there were controversies with regard to the criteria of evaluation, which
could be classified as referring either to the performance or to the legitimacy of the
project (Saretzki 2011: 226–227). This leads to the question of legitimation
problems of participation in TA.
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7 Legitimation problems of participatory processes in TA?
If we understand ‘‘problems’’ as being defined by a difference between an actual
state and a state that ought to be achieved, then legitimation problems indicate that
attempts to justify participation in a given case have not been entirely successful in
the eyes of relevant groups among the sponsors, participants, organizers or
observers of a participatory process. A rational reconstruction of the problems these
(at least partly critical) groups have identified with regard to the legitimation of
participation will have to make explicit reference to the approaches and criteria that
have been introduced to justify it in the first place. In the light of such
reconstructions, one can see that legitimation problems of participatory processes in
technology assessment and technology policy vary considerably, and they do so not
only with the two domains and the ways of their interrelation, but also with specific
features of the participatory processes such as their concrete topic, mode of
representation, timing, method of inquiry or procedure of deliberation and decision-
making. If we ask whether or not participation is seen as problematic in technology
assessment and technology policy-making and in what sense it is being evaluated as
problematic, then we find that the answer depends also on the approaches and
criteria that have (implicitly or explicitly) been used to legitimize or delegitimize
the call for and specific design of participation.
A rational reconstruction of claims concerning legitimation problems of
participatory processes in TA would try to interpret and reconstruct the reasoning
of an affirmative or critical judgement in question and make its sometimes tacit
(normative) assumptions explicit. If an explicitly normative approach based on
principles of democratic legitimacy provided the legitimation for (a specific type of)
participation, then legitimation problems would (in a rational reconstruction) have
to be (re-)conceptualized by identifying a lack of compatibility, conflicts or even
contradictions between the participatory procedures and practices observed and the
principles and norms of democracy, with the concrete problem definition depending
on the specific normative models of democracy and citizenship applied. If a
functional approach based on criteria of performance provided the legitimation for
(a specific type of) participation, then legitimation problems would be formulated
by identifying a lack of the performance or even total failure in terms of the
functions assigned or expected with regard to the information, social, spatial or time
dimension.
In the debates about participation in TA, legitimation problems have been
identified with regard to process and to results. In evaluations focussing on problems
related to the process dimension (explicit or implicit) references to normative
approaches of legitimation played an important role, whereas functional consider-
ations were dominating when issues of performance were at stake. At least upon
second sight, differences in evaluation did not pass uncontested, but lead to
controversies. In controversies with regard to process, the focus was on questions of
openness in the social (who had access?), temporal (enough time?) and substantial
dimension (predetermination of results?), on issues of representativeness (who is
representing whom, who should be represented, but is not?), on competences (rights
and duties of participants), on fairness of the procedural design, on rules of decision-
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making (majority vote and if so, minority report?) and on behaviour of various
actors involved. Controversies with regard to results focussed on questions of
factual adequacy and comprehensiveness, problem-solving capacity of policy
proposals, consensus building and acceptance generating capacity, binding force of
recommendations and chances of implementation of policy proposals. Some of the
controversies referred explicitly to the relation of the participatory procedure to its
social, economic, political and cultural context. This is where issues concerning the
relation of TA and technology policy play an important role. Critics raised questions
concerning issues of (mis-)representation, (limited) rights of participants, unequal
resource distribution among different groups of participants leading to ‘‘participa-
tion overload’’ or even ‘‘overkill’’ of some groups (Spangenberg 1993). Some critics
saw signs that groups involved were trying to instrumentalize a participatory
project, which could come ‘‘from above’’ using participation for external purposes
of producing legitimation and acceptance or fostering cooptation, adjournment or
displacement. Of course, participatory procedures are also open to attempts of
instrumentalization ‘‘from below’’, aiming not only at delegitimation of certain
established positions, but also at mobilization, protest or postponement of a
technological project. Moreover, the need to provide facilitation and professional
coordination of sometimes complex participatory designs leads to questions
concerning possible conflicts of interest of facilitators and mediators and possible
consequences of intensive participation in professionally managed consultation
projects for the capabilities of citizen groups for their self-organization (Saretzki
2008: 48–51; Felt and Fochler 2008; Fischer 2009: 99–102; Hoppe 2011: 215–241;
van Oudheusden 2011; Guston 2011).
8 Legitimation problems of policy analysts in participatory TA-processes?
As long as TA was functionally presented as a scientific activity like research and
institutionally located as if it was simply a part of the scientific system, TA-analysts
could interpret and legitimate their own role and activities with the help of
traditional images of a ‘‘neutral’’ or ‘‘objective technician’’ based on classical
models of positivistic science. To the extent that TA is now institutionally situated
between the scientific and the political system, oriented also towards a broader
public and is no longer perceived as part of the scientific system, the classical
legitimation with recourse to the old role as scientific expert is put into question.
Moreover, to the extent that people become aware of the epistemic limits of
positivistic science for problem-solving and policy-oriented analysis, the role of the
‘‘objective technician’’ is also internally cast into doubt. On the other hand, situating
oneself in the institutional space as part of the political system and interpreting
one’s own professional analyses simply as nothing but another kind of political
advocacy in a field of pluralistic interest group competition would also miss the
tasks of TA. And it would create other problems of legitimation regarding the role
of a specific ‘‘knowledge holder’’ communicating and mediating between science,
politics and the public. These legitimation problems are increasing, if and to the
extent that participation becomes an element or even a basic feature in the
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TA-process itself. Thus, given these new conditions, TA-analysts cannot and should
not try to refer to normative systems of either science or politics. Rather, they face
the challenge of developing a TA-specific set of principles and norms which can
serve as a system of reference for legitimating their own new roles, especially in the
context of participatory procedures in TA.
For this reorientation, a look at the debates in policy analysis may be helpful. TA has
already been conceptualized as policy analysis (Reber 2007) or at least as entailing
some kind of policy analysis (as a final step based on the assessment of technology
impacts and possible fields of social conflict, cf. the classical TA concept of Paschen
and Petermann 1991). Moreover, experienced practitioners of TA have already very
early pointed to the ‘‘insight that TA analyses are to be understood as argumentative
processes’’ (Paschen et al. 1978: 58, my translation). Remembering such insights, TA
may now under new conditions of extended participation learn especially from new
ideas that are associated with ‘‘the argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning’’
(Fischer and Forester 1993). The take-home messages of these calls for reorientation
can be summarized as follows: Rethink policy analysis (in TA) and its relations to
science and politics! That means on the one hand: Rethink the model of science! Leave
the focus on data and trust in abstract economic methods, realize the uncertainty and
ambiguity of scientific knowledge and turn to a post-positivist concept of science. On
the other hand: Rethink the model of politics! Overcome decisionist and technocratic
models of political decision-making, change orientation from elites to all sorts of
interested, affected or engaged actors and diverse publics, turn to an explicitly
democratic concept of politics. Moreover: Rethink your own role as policy analyst! Do
not uphold the image of ‘‘analyst as objective technician’’, accept the ambiguity of the
roles a policy analyst has to fulfil (in TA). Finally: Rethink the model of counsel and
advice! Realize the importance of language and argumentation, change your paradigm
from ‘‘analysis as science’’ towards ‘‘analysis as argument’’! (Saretzki 2012).
While the paradigm of policy analysis as science implied the role of an
‘‘objective technician’’ focussed on data collection and analysis, the functions and
roles of policy analysts in participatory TA-projects are much more diverse and
complex. On the one hand, the concept of policy analysis as argument implies that
analysts should work on the tasks of cognitive differentiation and knowledge
integration of impacts and options. These tasks will confront them with the
analytical challenge of operating as an interpreter, translator and producer of
arguments, working on the boundaries of various scientific disciplines, the local
knowledge and the life-world of other participants. On the other hand, the concept
of policy analysis as participatory procedure requires a procedural structuring of the
analytic-deliberative process and communication with the public. This task will
confront the TA-analyst with the challenge of working as designer, facilitator and
moderator of the participatory process (Saretzki 2005: 363–367).
9 Summary and conclusion
The idea of a ‘‘participatory technology’’ was invented as a response to legitimation
problems of technology in society and of technology policy in a democracy.
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Participation in technology assessment turned from a normative claim to a working
practice. Yet, the ‘‘if’’ and ‘‘how’’ of participation are still contested issues. While
participation was originally meant to solve legitimation problems of technology and
technology policy, the participatory problem-solving strategies also led to specific
new legitimation problems of their design and implementation. TA and technology
policy are still two different, but strongly interrelated domains. To understand their
legitimation problems in concrete cases, the specific ways of their interrelation in
concrete contexts need to be taken into account. From the perspective of a political
scientist focussing on the policy process, TA is not conceptualized as a set of
instruments from a tool box or as a social technology, but as an analytic-deliberative
process mediating between the functionally and institutionally differentiated
systems of science and politics and the public.
Empirical studies of participatory processes in TA and TP show variations in a
number of different analytical dimensions. Evaluations are accompanied by
controversies over different aspects of legitimacy and performance. Evaluating
participation in TA-processes within the juxtaposition of ‘‘legitimate hope versus
mere illusion’’ presupposes a functional justification. In the context of functional
justifications, problems of legitimation are better understood and should be
discussed as problems of performance. Far reaching, but disappointed hopes about
expected consequences of participation cannot provide the normative grounds to
deny its legitimacy. They can and should induce efforts to improve the performance
of participatory projects with regard to the functions assigned.
New tasks in participatory TA-processes create new roles for policy analysts with
new ‘‘threads and temptations of power’’ (Lasswell 1974: 177). As a result, policy
analysts working in participatory processes cannot simply take recourse to the
justifying principles of either science or politics. They are confronted with new
challenges for the legitimation of their professional activities in TA which require a
multidimensional, self-reflective and self-critical approach (Saretzki 2008).
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